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The concept of embodied cognition (EC) is not a settled one.  A variety of theorists have 
attempted to outline different approaches and meanings related to this concept.  They 
range from radical embodiment to minimal embodiment, and a number of positions in 
between.  In addition, a variety of approaches to the study of cognition have been closely 
associated with the notion of embodiment – including enactive, embedded, and extended 
or distributed cognition approaches.  Within these different perspectives there is no 
strong consensus on what weight to give to the concept of embodiment. Moreover, 
contrary to what some may think, not all EC approaches share a common opposition to 
the classical computational model of cognition.  In this chapter I want to map out the 
landscape of these various senses of embodied cognition.    
 
Minimal embodiment 
 
One recent account of how embodiment figures into explanations of cognition takes 
social cognition as a focus.  What Goldman and de Vignemont (2009) say about social 
cognition, however, can be applied to cognition generally.  They place strict constraints 
on how we are to understand embodiment.  So much so that most embodied theorists 
would likely fail to recognize what they describe as a case of embodied cognition and 
take it more as a dismissal of the importance of the body.  Their starting point assumes 
that almost everything of importance for human cognition happens in the brain, “the seat 
of most, if not all, mental events” (2009, 154).  Accordingly, the notion of embodied 
cognition seems all the more problematic if one defines the body as not including the 
brain, which is what they do: “Embodiment theorists want to elevate the importance of 
the body in explaining cognitive activities. What is meant by ‘body’ here? It ought to 
mean: the whole physical body minus the brain. Letting the brain qualify as part of the 
body would trivialize the claim that the body is crucial to mental life” (154).  In addition 
to removing the brain from the body, G&D remove the body from the environment: they 
want to understand the contribution of “the body (understood literally), not [as it is 
                                                
1 My research on this project was supported by a CNRS research grant as Visiting Researcher, Centre 
de Recherche en Epistémelogie Appliquée, École Polytechnique, Paris (2009-2010).   
related] to the situation or environment in which the body is embedded” (154). A core 
claim in EC, however, is that the body cannot be uncoupled from its environment.2  It 
would be difficult to find any EC theory that defines the body as this “literal,” and 
literally dead, brainless thing.    
 G&D further rule out anatomy and body activity (actions and postures) as trivial 
rather than important or constitutive contributors to cognitive processes. They are thus 
left with, as they put it, “sanitized” body representations. They regard the concept of 
body-formatted representations (“B-formats”) as “the  most  promising”  concept  for 
promoting  an EC  approach  (155). Unfortunately, they explain, there is no consensus 
about what B-formats are and their role in cognition is still under debate.  It seems clear, 
however, that G&D consider B-formatted representations to be brain states (in the 
context of social cognition they involve mirror neuron activation [156]), and as such, they 
do what many theorists do: they reduce embodiment to a set of neuronal processes.  
Although it’s not clear how the reduction of the body to a set of brain processes remains 
consistent with their earlier elimination of the brain as part of what embodiment means, 
this strategy really brings us back to a model that is not inconsistent with the classical 
computational (CC) one that EC opposes, or at the very lease it gives us an internalist 
view that is not inconsistent with the bodiless brain-in-a-vat conception of cognition. 
 G&D thus define embodiment and frame the problem in a way that precludes any 
significant contribution from the body. In doing so, they ignore the fact that EC 
challenges the very framework that they adopt.  G&D nonetheless present a clear 
challenge to EC, and they make it specific by providing a list of questions that EC 
theorists should answer in order to clarify their claims, and to help those who are not 
quite sure.  Here is their list (p. 158). 
 
1. Which interpretation of embodiment do they have in mind?  
2. Which sectors of cognition, or which cognitive tasks, do they say are embodied; 
and how fully does each task involve embodiment?  
3. How does the empirical evidence support the specific embodiment claims under 
the selected interpretation(s)?  
4. How do the proffered claims depart substantially from CC? 
  
Since a number of versions of EC reject representationalist theories of cognition, we can 
add a fifth question, closely related to (4). 
 
5. Do mental representations play a role in this version of EC? 
 
We can use these questions to guide our topographical survey, and we can start by 
asking them of G&V’s “most promising” but minimal conception of EC.  (1) They 
suggest a minimal interpretation which frames embodiment in terms of sanitized brain 
processes.  (2) Accordingly, they suggest it applies to some (but not all) aspects of social 
cognition, and not much else.  As they say, “It is doubtful, however, that such a thesis 
can  be  generalized”  (158).    On  their  view,  B‐formatted  representations  (perhaps 
                                                
2 E.g., “Given that bodies and nervous systems co-evolve with their environments, and only the behavior of 
complete animals is subjected to selection, the need for … a tightly coupled perspective should not be 
surprising” (Beer, 2000).  Also see Brooks (1991); Chemero (2009), Chiel and Beer (1997). 
mirror  neuron  activation)  may  feed  a  cognitive  simulation  process.    (3)  The 
empirical  evidence is tied to MN research, and evidence that lesions that affect B-
formatted representations “interfere with action and emotion recognition” (p. 156).  (4) 
Although this minimal version of EC seems relatively consistent with CC, since social 
cognition is not “pervasively embodied,” G&V suggest that CC never anticipated the 
“low-level nature” of B-representations.  (5) This version of EC is strongly 
representational.  
 
 
Biological embodiment: anatomy, chemistry, and movement 
 
In contrast to G&D, who rule out anatomy and bodily movement as important, non-trivial 
factors for cognition, other theorists suggest that anatomy and movement are important 
contributors to the shaping of cognition prior to brain processing (pre-processing) and 
subsequent to brain processing (post-processing) of information in the cognitive system 
(e.g., Chiel and Beer 1997; Shapiro 2004; Straus 1966; see Gallagher 2005a).  
Embodiment in this case means that extra-neural structural features of the body shape our 
cognitive experience.  For example, the fact that we have two eyes, positioned as they 
are, delivers binocular vision and allows us to see the relative depth of things.  Similar 
things can be said about the position of our ears and our ability to tell the direction of 
sound. As Shapiro puts it, “the point is not simply [or trivially] that perceptual processes 
fit bodily structure.  Perceptual processes depend on and include bodily structures” 
(2004, 190).   
Our sensory experience also depends on the way our head and body move, as we 
see in the case of parallax (Churchland, Ramachandran and Sejnowski 1994; Shapiro 
2004). Furthermore, our motor responses, rather than fully determined at brain-level, are 
mediated by the design of muscles and tendons, their degrees of flexibility, their 
geometric relationships to other muscles and joints, and their prior history of activation 
(Zajac 1993). Movement is not always centrally planned; it is based on a competitive 
system that requires what Andy Clark terms 'soft assembly'. The nervous system learns 
'to modulate parameters (such as stiffness [of limb or joint]) which will then interact with 
intrinsic bodily and environmental constraints so as to yield desired outcomes' (Clark 
1997: 45). 
Many of these insights are still cast in terms of information processing, and as 
such may be consistent with the general principles of classical cognitivism.  As Shapiro 
notes: “steps in a cognitive process that a traditionalist would attribute to symbol 
manipulation might, from the perspective of EC, emerge from the physical attributes of the 
body” (2007, p. 340).    In addition, even if  the body is doing some of the work, cognitivists 
could easily claim that pre‐processing is in fact feeding the more central processing that is 
certainly  more  constitutive  of  cognition,  just  as  post‐processing  is  to  some  degree 
determined by instructions from the brain as central processor.  
More holistic, proprioceptive and emotion-related processes, however, may be 
more challenging to the classical conception.  There is good empirical evidence that they 
have a profound effect on perception and thinking. For example, vibration-induced 
proprioceptive patterns that change the posture of the whole body are interpreted as 
changes in the perceived environment (Roll and Roll 1988: 162). Proprioceptive 
adjustments of the body schema can help to resolve perceptual conflicts (Harris 1965: 
419; Rock and Harris 1967). Experimental alterations of the postural schema lead to 
alterations in space perception and perceptual shifts in external vertical and horizontal 
planes (Bauermeister 1964; Wapner and Werner 1965). Likewise hormonal changes – 
changes in body chemistry – as well as visceral and musculoskeletal processes, can bias 
perception, memory, attention, and decision-making (Damasio 1994; Bechara et al. 1997; 
Gallagher 2005; Shapiro 2004).  The regulation of body chemistry is not autonomous 
from cognitive processes, and vice versa.  “Body regulation, survival, and mind are 
intimately interwoven” (Damasio, 1994, p. 123).   
On this reading of EC, the classic computational/functionalist thought experiment 
of the brain-in-the-vat completely fails.  The claim that cognitive function and experience 
would be the same, or even similar to a fully embodied subject, if the appropriate inputs 
were delivered to a disembodied brain in a vat fails to take into consideration the 
contributions of body performances.  As pointed out by a number of theorists, the 
experimenters would have to replicate everything that the biological body delivers in 
terms of pre-and post-processing, hormonal and neurotransmitter chemistry, and 
emotional life.  Thus, as Damasio suggests, this would require the creation of a body 
surrogate “and thus confirm that ‘body-type inputs’ are required for a normally minded 
brain after all” (1994, p. 228; also see Gallagher 2005b; Cosmelli and Thompson 2007). 
 
The body as semantic engine 
 
Not only does the structure, composition, and motor abilities of the body determine how 
we experience things, they also determine what we experience, and how we understand 
the world.  Varioius experiments show that how we are moving or posturing ourselves 
(e.g., pushing away vs. pulling toward) will affect our evaluations of target objects (e.g., 
Cacioppo, Priester & Bernston 1993; Chen & Bargh 1999).  Shapiro builds on 
observations made by French (1990) about the kind of cognitive associations we might 
make if our bodies were different.  If our eyes were located on our knees, for example, it 
would not only change our spatial perspectives, it would create differences in our 
conceptual associations.  We might associate crawling on the floor with torture (Shapiro 
2004, 195).  
Lakoff and Johnson, drawing primarily on cognitive and experimental linguistics 
and cultural anthropology, but also citing psychological, neuroscientific, and cognitive 
science research on mental rotation, mental imagery, gestures, and sign language, have 
famously argued that our conceptual life begins in spatial and motor behaviors and 
derives meaning from bodily experience (Johnson 2010; Lakoff, in press).  Accordingly, 
the “peculiar nature of our bodies shapes our very possibilities for conceptualization and 
categorization” (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, p. 19).  For them, the specific mechanism that 
bridges embodied experience and conceptual thought is metaphor.   
Metaphors are built on basic and recurring image-schemas such as front-back, in-
out, near-far, pushing, pulling, supporting, balance, etc., and the basic image-schemas are 
built on bodily experience (1999, p. 36).  Thus, “the concepts of front and back are body-
based.  They make sense only for beings with fronts and back.  If all beings on this planet 
were uniform stationary spheres floating in some medium and perceiving equally in all 
directions, they would have no concepts of front and back” (1999, p. 34).  Similar things 
can be said for up-down, and so forth.  These basic image-schemas then shape, 
metaphorically, our abstract conceptual thought in relation to planning and decision-
making, for example.  Thus, justice is conceived in terms of balance; virtue is conceived 
in terms of being upright; planning for the future is conceived in terms of up and forward 
– “What’s up?”  “What’s coming up this week?”  The in and out body-schema, and the 
containment metaphor, for example, range over a vast set of metaphors and concepts, 
from the close to literal: ‘John went out of the room’, to the abstract: ‘She finally came 
out of her depression’, or ‘I don't want to leave any relevant data out of my argument’, to 
the logically abstract, such as the law of the excluded middle in logic (Johnson 1987).  
This view has been extended to explanations of mathematical concepts as well (Lakoff 
and Núñez 2000). 
At least in some respects, the embodied view taken up by Lakoff and Johnson 
involves neural embodiment. “An embodied concept is a neural structure that is part of, 
or makes use of the sensorimotor system of our brains. Much of conceptual inference is, 
therefore, sensorimotor inference” (1999, p. 20).  Although generally the Lakoff-Johnson 
view is taken to be consistent with a connectionist view, on at least one interpretation 
(Zlatev 2010) their position is not inconsistent with classical cognitivism.  Yet, consistent 
with more enactive views of cognition, they eschew strong representationalism.  
 
As we said in Philosophy in the Flesh, the only workable theory of representations 
is one in which a representation is a flexible pattern of organism-environment 
interactions, and not some inner mental entity that somehow gets hooked up with 
parts of the external world by a strange relation called ‘reference’. We reject such 
classical notions of representation, along with the views of meaning and reference 
that are built on then. Representation is a term that we try carefully to avoid. 
(Johnson & Lakoff 2002: 249-250)  
 
Embodied functionalism 
 
In some regards the notion of an embodied functionalism is either trite, since even 
functionalist systems need to be physically embodied, or contradictory, since one 
hallmark of functionalism is a certain indifference to the physicality that sustains the 
system (body neutrality, multiple realizability).  The idea that functionalists should take 
notions of embodiment seriously, however, can be found in some discussions of the 
extended mind, e.g., Andy Clark (2008a), Wheeler (2005); Rowlands (2006; 2010).  I’ll 
focus on Clark as the main proponent of this view.  On the one hand, Clark argues for a 
step back towards the idea of a minimal embodiment in the sense that he considers 
factors associated with anatomical determination and embodied semantics to be “trivial 
and uninteresting” rather than deeply “special” (2008b, 38).  On the other hand, he 
defends the notion that the body plays an important role as part of the extended 
mechanisms of cognition.  In this regard, the physical body functions as a non-neural 
vehicle for cognitive processes, in much the same general way that the physical processes 
of neurons do.  The body is part of an extended cognitive system that starts with the brain 
and includes body and environment. As he puts it, “the  larger  systemic  wholes, 
incorporating  brains,  bodies,  the  motion  of  sense  organs,  and  (under  some 
conditions)  the  information‐bearing  states  of  non‐biological  props  and  aids,  may 
sometimes  constitute  the  mechanistic  supervenience  base  for  mental  states  and 
processes” (2008b, 38).   
This view  is not  to be confused with  the  idea  that  the  (human) body offers 
certain determining constraints (sensory‐motor contingencies) that make (human) 
experience  unique,  an  idea  associated  with  O’Regan  and  Noë’s  (2001)  theory  of 
enactive  perception.    Clark  is  not  convinced  that  an  animal  with  a  very  different 
body could not experience certain aspect of  the spatial environment  in exactly  the 
same way. Rather, different bodies can compute or process information differently 
but  still  produce  the  same  experience.    The  important  thing  for  Clark  (citing  as 
evidence  experiments  by  Ballard  et  al.  1997)  is  that  part  of  the  computing 
mechanism can  include  the body.    In accomplishing certain  tasks,  for example, we 
could  store  task‐relevant  information  in  our  brain‐based  memory  system  and 
consult the information in that store; alternatively, we could leave it the information 
in the environment where it is and simply use our bodies to perceptually consult it 
when  needed.    In  the  latter  case,  consistent  with  Rob Wilson’s  (1994)  notion  of 
‘exploitative representation’ and ‘wide computing’, the perceiving body is playing a 
certain computational role that could be done fully “in the head”; the body does this 
sort of thing frequently, and in effect operates as an “external” vehicle for cognition.  
As Clark  (2007) makes  clear,  this view of  an embodied extension of  cognition  (he 
calls  it  ‘simple  embodiment’  [Clark  1999])  is  also  consistent  with  a  robust 
representationalism  for  higher  cognitive  processes,  as  well  as  with  a  minimal 
representationalism  (involving  action‐oriented  representations)  for  action  (see 
Clark and Grush 1999).  
One way to split the difference between those who would argue for a special 
and  essential  role  for  embodiment  and  those  who  would  give  the  body  only  a 
“simple”  functional  role,  is  to  suggest  that  embodiment  especially  matters  for 
phenomenal  consciousness,  but  not  for  cognition.    The  same  cognitive  results 
supervening  on  specifically  embodied  processes  may  feel  different  or  register 
differently  in  experience,  while  still  being  functionally  equivalent  in  regard  to 
cognitive state.   
Clark hesitates to accept this kind of division of  labor.   He argues that even 
for  experience  one  should  allow  the  possibility  that  the  cognitive  system  will 
provide “compensatory downstream adjustments” that would, so to speak, even out 
differences  in  the  experiential  aspects  that  accompany  cognition  (Clark  2007).  
While there seems no strong reason to think this is the case (Clark cites no evidence 
to  support  this  view),  or  even  to  think  that  it  should  be  the  case  (after  all,  why 
should  it matter  that  a  frog’s  consciousness  have  the  same  phenomenal  feel  as  a 
human’s consciousness), there is some evidence against it.   Wearing prism goggles 
changes visual experience by altering the angle of perspective on the visual field.  A 
set of prism goggles may shift the visual field to the right by 40 degrees, or may even 
invert  the  visual  field.    It was once  thought  that  the perceptual  system eventually 
corrects  for  this  distortion  and  the  subject,  who  is  initially  disoriented,  starts  to 
experience the world and act in it as if she were not wearing the goggles. That would 
mean that the visual system makes compensatory downstream adjustments at brain 
level  to  restore  visual‐motor  experience  to  our  normal  parameters.    But  this  has 
been  shown  not  to  be  the  case  (Linden  et  al.  1999).    Subjects  make  important 
adjustments in their motor behavior, but their visual experience remains distorted.  
Prism  glasses  basically  change  the  normal  visual  system  at  the  basic  bodily  level 
(that  is,  the normal workings of  the physical eye, plus the prism glasses, would be 
equivalent to a different eye structure).  Brain‐based processes that may allow us to 
adjust motor behavior to cope with this different visual experience, however, do not 
allow  for  a  compensatory  downstream  adjustments  that  would  restore  upright 
visual experience.  Even if this suggests that Clark might be wrong about the idea of 
compensatory effects with respect to experience, restoring the compromise division 
of  labor  (functionalist  cognition  vs  embodied  consciousness)  it  was  meant  to 
challenge, is hardly consistent with stronger versions of EC.  
 
Radical embodiment 
 
Enactive views on embodied cognition emphasize the idea that perception is 
for  action,  and  that  this  action‐orientation  shapes most  cognitive  processes.    This 
approach  often  comes  with  strong  calls  to  radically  change  our  ways  of  thinking 
about  the  mind  and  doing  cognitive  science  (e.g.,  Gallagher  and  Varela  2003; 
Thompson 2007; Thompson and Varela 2001; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 2001).   
Thompson and Varela  (2001) agree on Clark’s  (1999)  three‐point summary of  the 
enactive view: 
 
(1) understanding the complex interplay of brain, body and world requires the tools 
and methods of nonlinear dynamical systems theory;  
(2) traditional notions of representation and computation are inadequate;  
(3) traditional decompositions of the cognitive system into inner functional 
subsystems or modules (‘boxology’) are misleading, and blind us to arguably 
better decompositions into dynamical systems that cut across the brain–body–
world divisions.  
   (Thompson and Varela 2001, 418; also see Chemero 2009, 29). 
 
Similar to Clark and the idea of extended cognition, enactive approaches argue that 
cognition is not entirely “in the head,” but distributed across brain, body, and 
environment.  In contrast to Clarke’s functionalist view, however, enactive theorists 
claim that the (human) bodily processes shape and contribute to the constitution of 
consciousness and cognition in an irreducible and irreplaceable way.  Specifically, on the 
enactive view, biological aspects of bodily life, including organismic and emotion 
regulation of the entire body, have a permeating effect on cognition, as do processes of 
sensori-motor coupling between organism and environment.  Noë (2004; also see 
O’Regan and Noë 2001; Hurley 1998) developed a detailed account of enactive 
perception where sensory-motor contingencies and environmental affordances take over 
the work that had been attributed to neural computations and mental representations.    
 Thompson and Varela (2001) and Gallagher (2001; 2005a) add to this the 
dimension of intersubjective interaction, which, they regard, in contrast to Goldman and 
de Vignemont, as involving fully embodied processes that involve facial expression, 
posture, movement, gestures, and distinct forms of sensory-motor couplings.  This is 
supported by developmental studies that suggest infants engage in embodied 
intersubjective practices from birth. Mirror neurons may contribute to “primary 
intersubjecive” processes (Trevarthen 1979), understood as part of the neural 
underpinnings of enactive social perception of motor intentions and response preparation 
rather than a simulation or simple mirroring of mental states (Gallagher 2007).  Context 
and social environment also contribute to “secondary intersubjective” (Trevarthen and 
Hubley 1978) practices starting at 9-12 months of age.  In the intersubjective context, 
perception is often for inter-action with others, where perceptually-guided interaction 
becomes a principle of social cognition and generates meaning in a process of 
‘participatory sense-making’ (De Jaegher and Di Paulo 2007; De Jaegher, Di Paulo, and 
Gallagher, in press; Gallagher 2009).    
  
 
Table 1. Different theories of embodiment 
 
Interpretation  Minimal 
embodiment 
Embodied 
functionalism 
Biological 
embodiment  
Embodied 
semantics 
Radical 
(enactive) 
embodiment 
Sectors of 
cognition 
Social 
cognition 
Perception/action 
& higher‐level 
cognition 
Perception/ 
action 
Higher‐level 
cognition 
Perception/ 
action, social 
cognition 
Empirical 
evidence 
Neuroscience 
(MNs, 
lesions) 
Experimental 
psychology, 
robotics, 
engineering 
Biology, 
experimental 
psychology 
Linguistics, 
psychology, 
neuroscience, 
cultural 
anthropology 
Developmental 
psychology, 
neuroscience, 
empirical 
psychology 
Consistent with 
CC 
Yes  Yes  Neutral  Neutral  No 
Representations  Strong yes  Yes for 
“representation 
hungry” 
processes and 
minimal 
representations 
for action  
Weak   Weak  No 
Representatives  Goldman &   
De Vignemont 
Clark, Wheeler, 
Rowlands 
Shapiro, 
Beers 
Johnson, 
Lakoff, 
Nuñez,  
Varela, 
Thompson, 
Noë, Gallagher, 
Hutto 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
It is often thought that EC approaches, even if they differ among themselves, are 
united in their opposition to traditional versions of computationalism and 
representationalism, but this is clearly not the case.  Indeed, disagreements within the EC 
camp are primarily disagreements about just these issues. But perhaps one important 
outcome of the EC approaches is that they have moved the issues about 
computationalism and representationalism front and center, even in the minds of those 
who have taken less-embodied approaches.  Thus there have been recent wholesale 
investigations into the concept of representation (e.g., Chemero 2009; Hutto 2008; 
Gallagher 2008; Ramsey 2007), as well as careful and somewhat defensive explanations 
of what representation means in analytic philosophy of mind (e.g., Burge 2010; and see 
Crane 2008 for a similar analysis).  On the EC side, it seems incumbent to deliver on 
some promissory notes.  As Chemero (2009) makes clear, it will be important to “scale 
up” dynamic systems approaches from the analysis of action and perception to higher 
cognitive performance in what are considered to be “representation-hungry” tasks (Clark 
and Toribio 1994).  “It is still an open-question how far beyond minimally cognitive 
behaviors radical embodied cognitive science can get” (Chemero 2009, 43). Accordingly, 
within EC one of the most important and interesting debates is that between functionalist 
and radical versions, the first appealing to representations and eschewing any essentialist 
view of the body, the second dismissing representations and insisting on the ineliminable 
nature of the body.  One of the leading theoretical questions in this field is whether it’s 
possible to integrate these views (see Menary 2007) or to defend a non-functionalist and 
enactive version of the extended mind hypothesis (Gallagher, in press).  
What is clear, however, in contrast to Goldman and de Vignemont’s critical 
suggestions, is that embodied approaches to cognition are not brainless; the proper 
explanatory unit is brain-body-environment rather than the “body (understood literally).” 
Furthermore, EC is supported by good scientific evidence from a variety of disciplines, 
including brain science.  Understood broadly, EC is also able to address multiple sectors 
of cognition, from action and perception, to social cognition, and more abstract, higher-
level cognition. Goldman and de Vignemont (2009) begin their essay dramatically by 
suggesting that “a specter is haunting the laboratories of cognitive science” – the EC 
reply can only be “Bodies of the world unite … with your brains and your 
environments!” 
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